Is Eskom’s data reflective of the true situation?

Why do we have loadshedding?

Full article at iol

A team of engineers from Truth in Energy (TiE) and the Economic Interventionist Forum of South Africa (EIFSA) regularly collaborates to monitor Eskom's performance utilizing publicly available data and information from whistleblowers that include members throughout South Africa’s electricity and energy supply chain. Through this method, we can triangulate the claims regarding Eskom's performance and assess the accuracy of both Eskom's and the Minister of Electricity’s claims regarding loadshedding.

We would like to alert the public that in the last week of November 2023, a major discrepancy between public communications and data integrity seems to have emerged, prompting us to request transparency from Eskom. The level of Unplanned Capacity Loss Factor (UCLF) and Planned Capacity Loss Factor (PCLF) published, did not justify the levels of loadshedding, especially when we consider the resynchronisation of Kusile’s units. We have information from our sources that the number of outages reported did not correspond with what was said in public when the Minister of Electricity, Kgosientsho Ramokgopa, claimed that “heatwaves” were responsible for loadshedding.

Is Eskom’s data reflective of the true situation?

It's worth noting the following facts and sequence of events.

• •         On November 18, 2023, Eskom informed that Koeberg Unit 1 would be resynchronized to the grid.

• •         Koeberg Unit 2 has not yet experienced downtime for a life extension.

• •         On November 29 at 01:53, Stage 5 load shedding hit South Africa, despite Eskom announcing the return of Kusile Unit 2 on the same day.

• •         Rooftop solar in South Africa is estimated to contribute around 3 GW during the day.

• •         During the week of the Rugby World Cup, Eskom’s UCLF was 13 GW.

• •         In the last week of November 2023, Eskom reported 13.5 GW of data.

Theoretically, South Africa should have only half a stage of load shedding during the evening peak.

As the graph above shows, South Africa should have had only 1 stage of loadshedding during the last week of November, yet Eskom announced stage 4 during the day?

Our sources tell us about the following information for November December 1 at 19:00 Eskom had a shortfall of 7.23 GW.

Therefore, the UCLF should have been at least 21 GW of breakdowns as opposed to the 13.54GW that was communicated.

Further clarification is required on the nature of the UCLF, as our sources tell us that broken down powerplants such as the following units are not included in Eskom’s Dashboard.

•         Duvha Unit 3

•         Grootvlei Unit 4

•         Grootvlei Unit 5

•         Grootvlei Unit 6

•         4 broken units at Hendrina.

As Dr. Frans Cronje of the Social Research Foundation argued in June 2023, if a decision were to be taken to bring only these units back online then South Africa might exit loadshedding within a 18month period.

It is worth noting that whilst Eskom previously published the status of the power stations and units that tripped, this information is no longer being communicated, leading to the suspicion that Eskom is deliberately withholding information.

In addition Breakdowns at each station shows a lack of correlation with the ageing of the plant but rather to poor operations and maintenance practices. Notable issues include:

• •         The use of dirty water in the cooling water systems

• •         The neglect of proper ash handling

• •         Inadequate cleaning of fans at dry-cooled power stations like Medupi, Kusile, and Matimba,

• •         The boiler tube failures that Eskom announced are reported to be entirely operations-related, highlighting a need for improvement in operational practices.

• •         The institutional culture at Eskom is reportedly so poor that operators often respond with death threats when technical advisors flag issues.

• •         Our sources indicate that the nature of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) has made it practically impossible for competent Operations and Maintenance (O&M) contractors to engage with Eskom.

The above observations lead to the following conclusions:

• •         Eskom may not be accurately reporting the UCLF and might not have the capacity it claims.

• •         A change in operator and a proper reliability program are severely lacking at Eskom.

• •         Eskom has broken down plants that could easily be repaired if there is political will to do so.

• •         The South African Cabinet should be aware of the status of Eskom’s fleet following the report by the German-based company VGBE Energy, and there is a desire for this report to become public.

• •         Eskom’s procurement process (the PPFA) appears to hinder Operations and Maintenance from taking place effectively.

Hügo KRÜGER                                                                                                Sdumo Hlope

Sokesperson TiE                                                                      CEO EIFSA